







## Office Memorandum

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director  
 FROM : Major G. W. Ford,  
 Room 1406,  
 War Building  
 SUBJECT:

In view of the fact that the

country of Colonel Smith is a

for your perusal copy of a letter from

Certain Criticism.





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**SECRET**

Colonel J. J. Brown

The Director  
for C. J. [unclear]  
connection with the [unclear]  
the above mentioned officer.  
[unclear] [unclear]  
[unclear] accounting from [unclear]

**SECRET**





## OFFICE OF CHIEF OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C.

## MEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. Charles Cheston  
 FROM: B. Homer Hall

This refers to the [redacted] which Colonel Morgan arranged for Colonel Bihin of the Belgian Surete and his adjutant.


If you authorize this tour would it be possible to use the General's small plane for the 5 day trip through the Middle West.

*B. H. H.*  
 B. H. H.

*I have a question -  
 Have you any  
 knowledge of what was  
 said to him for a time  
 to what extent they  
 have in the [redacted]  
 etc.*

**SECRET**





## OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DATE

TO

FROM

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DISTRIBUTION

REF ID:

CLASSIFICATION

TRANSMITTED IN CODE DECRYPTED

Q-2750  
3-7-8LONDON  
1943MASTER, DEPT. OF STATE, WASHINGTON, D.C.  
INFO: DEPT. OF STATE, WASHINGTON, D.C.  
1943

STATE DEPARTMENT TELLING AMBASSY BRUSSELS TODAY GRANTING  
 FULL LEAVE FOR COLONEL ROYAL AND LT. DOULTRENT. EITHER OR  
 BOTH MAY LEAVE FOR U.S. AS LONG AS VISCAS ARE ISSUED BY BRUSSELS.  
 EMPASBY

FILE COPY

TOD: 12 JUNE 43

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 WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DATE  
FROM

TO

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR INFORMATION

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER

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Form 67 (Revised)

# OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE 10 APR 15  
FROM

TO USTRAVIC, LONDON

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DISTRIBUTION

(FOR ACTION)

(FOR INFORMATION)

MAGRUDER

DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, FIELD OFFICE

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

17-142

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER

#21434 TO MAGRUDER FROM FORGAN AND SHEPARDSON, RE YOUR #1134  
TO PARIS. (OUT 8448)

ASSUME YOU ARE NOW CLEARING COLONEL SMITH AND LT. COLT  
D'OUTREMONT WITH STATE DEPARTMENT. THEREFORE, UNLESS WE HEAR  
CONTRARY WILL ISSUE FORMAL INVITATION TO THEM ON FRIDAY.

SECRET

TDR: 1010

10 APR 15

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WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT

Form 68 (Rev. 4-54)

## OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE 9 APRIL 1945

REC'D

1340 1 APR 45

TO

PARIS, FRANCE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

FROM

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DISTRIBUTION

OUT 1448

(CONFIRMATION TO ORIGINATOR)

(FOR INFORMATION)

MAGRUDER

DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, FIELD  
SECTION

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-57842-1

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER

SECRET

#11414. FORGAY FROM MAGRUDER.

TODAY BISSELL INFORMED ME HIS REPORTS FROM SHAEF INDICATE  
THAT THERE IS NOTHING IN RECORDS OF COLONEL BIRN AND LIEUT. COUNT  
D'OUTREMENT WHICH WOULD PRECLUDE THEIR VISITING THE UNITED STATES.

SECRET

TOD: 1930 9 APR 45

JM GEB

INITIALS OF "RELEASING" OFFICER

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WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT

CONFIDENTIAL

## Office Memorandum

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : General Donovan

FROM : W. H. Woodward

SUBJECT: Your suggestion concerning list of names of Roman Catholics

In response to your suggestion, I sent the following message to David Shaw-

"General Donovan told me that George Bowden told him he had left a list of names of available Roman Catholics for use in Germany. I don't know where George left such papers. General Donovan said maybe in his office. Anyway will you tear around, while I am away, to find the list. Telephone G.P. if necessary."

I have received from David Shaw's office the following information regarding their efforts to locate the list.

"Telephoned George Bowden and received following information: in old SC Goodfellow files is a listing of people in Chicago district recommended by Bowden some of whom are Roman Catholics and some of whom are Germans. List left at time of G.B.'s separation.

"Goodfellow's secretary says Bowden material. May be in because Jimmy Murphy has left in safe by Bowden."

CONFIDENTIAL



General Donovan  
page 2.

"The House of Representatives

"The House of Representatives

"The House of Representatives

and is hereby referred to the committee on

reports of the committee on

(11)  
U.S.S.

T.S. - The House of Representatives  
has passed a bill  
which will be  
reported to the  
House of Representatives





10-11-68

1944

Director, FBI

2. It is important to note that the original classification of the document as "Confidential" was based on the fact that the information contained therein was of a sensitive nature and its disclosure could be detrimental to the national defense.

3. In the basis of Major Allen's statement  
of disciplinary action against Col. Miller and Maj  
referred."

Colonel, 2nd  
Sergeant

J. C. McNEELY, JR.  
Hon. Sec., C.A.C.

Mr. C. A. C.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

1. The first part of the document is a list of names and their corresponding addresses. The names are listed in the left column, and the addresses are listed in the right column. The names are: John Doe, Jane Smith, and Bob Johnson. The addresses are: 123 Main Street, 456 Elm Street, and 789 Oak Street.

1. The first step in the process of identifying a potential threat is to determine the nature of the threat. This can be done by reviewing the threat's history, its current status, and its potential impact on the organization. Once the nature of the threat has been identified, the next step is to assess the threat's severity. This can be done by evaluating the threat's potential to cause harm, its likelihood of occurring, and the organization's ability to respond to the threat. Finally, the third step is to develop a response plan. This plan should outline the organization's strategy for dealing with the threat, including the roles and responsibilities of the various departments involved.

[illegible]

John Hall was not present but our rules and regulations of the bulletin board outside the orderly room specifically states that demolitions would be used only under the supervision of a qualified officer and would be used only in training. A few weeks before we had an instance of demolitions being used for this same purpose as a result of which we had promulgated that regulation to control such use. Therefore I took it upon myself to tell Pat McNeil that I would handle the situation and I sent him back to bed. I then made the foolish mistake of not going to the door to see what was going on

21-

1. The first part of the document is a letter from the President of the United States to the Congress, dated January 1, 1861. It is a formal communication, and it is written in a very dignified and official style. The President expresses his regret that he cannot deliver the message in person, and he explains the reasons for this. He then proceeds to discuss the state of the Union, and he mentions the recent election of Abraham Lincoln as President. He also mentions the secession of the Southern States, and he expresses his confidence that the Union will remain intact.



Major Jones (Continued):

to give me the grenades. I went to the office and found Jones sitting at his desk. He had a drink in front of him and asked me if I had any more. I said I didn't have any more.

I went back to the office and found Jones sitting at his desk. He had a drink in front of him and asked me if I had any more. I said I didn't have any more.

COL. FITZ: They came away from the dock with you?

MAJOR ALLEN: Yes sir.

COL. FITZ: Had he been drinking excessively?

MAJOR ALLEN: I couldn't say sir, but I'm quite sure he was drinking. I wouldn't know for sure.

MR. MCMAHER: Any evidence of their being ill as the result of having had so much liquor earlier?

MAJOR ALLEN: I can't say exactly, but I don't know. I was at the next morning that the men near Col. Eiler's room had heard of the situation throughout the night.

COL. FITZ: Major Jones at that time was in command of the whole set-up of the island?

MAJOR ALLEN: Yes sir.

COL. FITZ: When you got the message from the dock originally did Sgt. McCall say that Major Jones directed or did he say that Col. Eiler wanted these grenades?

MAJOR ALLEN: That I couldn't say, but I believe he said that two (2) officers down on the dock wanted these grenades.

MAJ. MCMAHER: Who was in command of the installation on the night of August 24th?

MAJOR ALLEN: I can't remember who was Officer of the Day.

MAJ. MCMAHER: Who was Post Commander?

MAJOR ALLEN: Major Head who was in on liberty in Avalon.

COL. FITZ: That left you in as second in command?

1. NAME: [redacted]  
 2. DOB: [redacted]  
 3. GRADE: [redacted]  
 4. DUTY STATION: [redacted]  
 5. DUTY ASSIGNMENT: [redacted]  
 6. DUTY DESCRIPTION: [redacted]  
 7. DUTY LOCATION: [redacted]  
 8. DUTY DATES: [redacted]  
 9. DUTY STATUS: [redacted]  
 10. DUTY COMMENTS: [redacted]  
 11. DUTY EVALUATION: [redacted]  
 12. DUTY RECOMMENDATION: [redacted]  
 13. DUTY ACTION: [redacted]  
 14. DUTY APPROVAL: [redacted]  
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 16. DUTY DATE: [redacted]  
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 18. DUTY DATES: [redacted]  
 19. DUTY STATUS: [redacted]  
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 32. DUTY RECOMMENDATION: [redacted]  
 33. DUTY ACTION: [redacted]  
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 95. DUTY SIGNATURE: [redacted]  
 96. DUTY DATE: [redacted]  
 97. DUTY LOCATION: [redacted]  
 98. DUTY DATES: [redacted]  
 99. DUTY STATUS: [redacted]  
 100. DUTY COMMENTS: [redacted]

Q. And how?

A. I don't know.

Q. Did you see any weapons?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What weapons?

A. I saw a rifle.

Q. What kind of rifle?

A. I don't know.

Q. Did you see any other weapons?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did you see any other weapons?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did you see any other weapons?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did you see any other weapons?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did you see any other weapons?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did you see any other weapons?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did you see any other weapons?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did you see any other weapons?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did you see any other weapons?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did you see any other weapons?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did you see any other weapons?

A. No, sir.





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## Office Memorandum

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

Colonel G. C. Monroe

FROM :

W. M. Mayo

SUBJECT:

General Donovan requested yesterday that I appoint an officer to serve on Colonel Goodfellow's committee which intends to interview enlisted men.

I have appointed Major Frank Ball to this committee and this appointment has Colonel Goodfellow's approval.

W. M. Mayo  
Acting Deputy Director  
Administrative Services





( )

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CONFIDENTIAL

A number of governments have now exchanged embassies with the Czechoslovak Government-in-Exile in place of the earlier legations. The Government of the United States has not yet bestowed this diplomatic accolade but may do so soon.

There has been a serious financial question and the British are understood to be footing the bill. There have been rumors that the Soviet Government has invited the Czechoslovak Government to move to Moscow, but these rumors are without verification.

The fourth major Czechoslovak problem mentioned previously has been the matter of securing repudiation of the Munich Agreement. That agreement has now been formally repudiated by Great Britain and by the Fighting French National Committee in London. Moscow has announced that it will support the re-establishment of the pre-1938 Czechoslovak frontiers. The United States Government has made no formal declaration but has merely stated that it had never recognized the validity of the Munich Agreement. President Benes has undoubtedly been trying to pull the other powers in the direction of a repudiation of Munich that would constitute a guarantee of the re-establishment of Czechoslovakia's pre-1938 frontiers.

#### Opposition in Exile

Within the Czechoslovak community in exile the charge has been raised by certain members that President Benes is dictatorial.

Miller Hozza, Prime Minister at the time of Munich, has never collaborated with Dr. Benes in exile though he is a member of the State Council. A resident of the United States since the fall of 1941, Dr. Hozza has raised the issue of greater autonomy for Slovakia

(192th)

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after the war. Stefan Osusky, former Minister to France, was for a time a member of the State Council, from which, it is charged by Osusky's friends, he was ousted by Dr. Benes. Osusky has begun a pamphleteering campaign against President Benes and against the Presidential Principle as a political fiction. (See "Foreign Nationalities" Memorandum Number 105.) Considerable opposition has been encountered from a few other Czech and Slovak political refugees in London.

President Benes has also been repeatedly attacked as an alleged "tool of Moscow" by those who feel that a Communist menace exists. Dr. Benes defended this aspect of his policy at some length in his formal address to the Czechoslovak State Council of November 16, 1942. He said, among other things:

"It was fateful for the politics of Europe after the last war that no attempt was made in time to include the Soviet Union in the common work for peace and the equilibrium of Europe -- a state so great and powerful which is such a fundamental part of the European continent, which cannot be excluded from it just as it cannot be limited to its periphery. And, anyone who attempted to previously was even then only working, even without having this intention, for Nazi Germany, and anyone who attempted it today would only be working for a new European catastrophe."

President Benes has placed himself in opposition to any sort of confederation scheme for Eastern Europe unless undertaken in complete accord with Soviet Russia and Great Britain.

Early in 1942 the Czechoslovak Government-in-Exile made a preliminary agreement with the Polish Government-in-Exile concerning an eventual federation arrangement between the two nations. President Benes has left the project in suspense, however, as relations became more strained between the Poles and the Soviet Union because

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CONFIDENTIAL

of the question of the eventual fate of the Eastern Polish provinces. He said in his November address:

"There is needed the genuine and friendly and loyal collaboration of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union. Our relation to both is one of alliance and friendship and we want it always to remain such."

In the matter of the future relationship between the nationalities making up the Czechoslovak state, President Benes emphasizes the necessity for complete unity at present and holds that decisions regarding the amount of autonomy to be given each group must be decided by the people after the war.

Given his principles and his history, it seems evident that Eduard Benes is a righteous man. His opponents charge that he is self-righteous. However, history's only question will be: was he right? He has already attained eminence in history such as to impose that question on the historian.

(15381)

CONFIDENTIAL

- 20 -

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF WORKS BY DR. EDUARD BENES  
(Supplied by the Czechoslovak Information Center)

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Free Thought, Socialism and Social Democracy, Prague, 1908  
 The National Question, Prague, 1909  
 Short Survey of the Development of Modern Socialism, 1st volume, Prague, 1910  
 Our Political Education and the Necessity of a High School of Social Science,  
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 The Problem of Alcohol Production and Prohibition, Prague, 1915  
 T. G. Masaryk, Annemasse, 1916  
 To the Czechoslovak Prisoners in France and Italy, Paris, 1917  
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 Annihilate Austria-Hungary [see French edition]; Prague, 1920  
 War and Culture, Prague, 1922  
 On the Nature of Political Partisanship, Prague, 1923  
 The Significance of the Czechoslovak Revolution, Prague, 1923  
 International Policy and Democracy, Prague, 1923  
 Five Years of Czechoslovak Foreign Policy, Prague, 1924  
 The Problems of New Europe and the Czechoslovak Foreign Policy, Prague, 1924  
 The Diplomatic Field for Czechoslovak Freedom, Prague, 1924  
 Problems of Democracy, Prague, 1924  
 The Problem of Small Nations After the War, Prague, 1926  
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 The World War and Our Revolution, 3 volumes, Prague, 1927/28  
 For the Integrity of Public Life, Prague, 1927  
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 Is Permanent Peace Possible?, Prague, 1931  
 The League of Nations and its Organizational Purposes, Prague, 1932  
 The Democratic Army, Pacifism and Foreign Policy, Prague, 1932  
 The Fight for a Higher Political Culture of the Nation, Prague, 1932  
 Speech to the Slovaks, Bratislava, 1932  
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 France and New Europe, Prague, 1935  
 The Political Activity and the Philosophy of T. G. Masaryk, Prague, 1935

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How to Work for Peace, Prague, 1936  
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 Masaryk's Way and Heritage, Prague, 1937  
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## II

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Le Problème Autrichien et la Question Tchéque, Paris, 1908  
 Le Socialisme Autrichien et la Guerre, Paris, 1915  
 Détruisez l'Autriche-Hongrie, Paris, 1916  
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 Bohemia's Case for Independence, London, 1917  
 Les Tchécoslovaques, Paris, 1918  
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 L'Avenir de la Société des Nations, Prague, 1935  
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 The Problems of Czechoslovakia, Prague, 1936  
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 Democracy Today and Tomorrow, New York and London, 1940  
 The New Order in Europe, London, 1941  
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 Future of the Small Nations and the Idea of Federation, London, 1942  
 The Organization of Post-war Europe, New York, 1942  
 The Way to Victory, London, 1942  
 What Would be a Good Peace, London, 1943

This list is not complete and contains, particularly for the last few years, only publications of major importance.

(15344)

## OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

## INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: General Donovan  
FROM: Edmond L. Taylor  
SUBJECT: Comments on Attached Memorandum

DATE: 20 May 1943

I do not think the problem is a very important one either way. It seems to me merely a question of balancing the minor benefits to be derived from putting Japs to useful work against the minor danger of a little scattered espionage and sabotage.

Attachment

EST



3709 Boyce Ave.  
Los Angeles, California  
May 15-1943

Colonel William J. Donovan  
Defense Coordinator  
U.S. Army and Navy, Washington, D.C.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

I am sending you herewith a copy of an article I have just sent to Chauncey Hamlin.

I felt that Colonel Roosevelt's words regarding the Japanese and my reference to the letter shown me by Mr. Raymond B. Price would be of interest to you. My opinions on the Japanese situation are, of course, secondary, but I am very much in earnest and hope that the east is not going to permit it to be solely a California and Pacific coast question.

Margel Gluck and I see a great deal of each other. She has just been engaged as technical adviser on the film to be produced depicting the life of John Philip Sousa; you will recall that she toured with him for a number of seasons as solo violinist. We have both said that we wished we had a definite piece of war work to do (defense work rather) that you would assign to us. You know our experience and qualifications so if there is something that you consider we might do out here please call on us.

We were both happy to know that you are engaged in an important strategic defense position in Washington.

With kind regards and best wishes,

Sincerely yours

(Mrs. Frank H.)

*Caroline Mirza Bliss*  
Caroline Mirza Bliss



Caroline Mirza Bliss (Mrs. Frank H.)  
 3709 Boyce Ave.  
 Los Angeles, California

"THE AMERICAN BOOBY"

The possibility that Japanese may be shifted from relocation centers into useful work and the armed service has aroused public opinion in California against such a change of policy for the duration.

This is not a California question, altho, without doubt, the people on the Pacific coast know it better than those in other sections of the United States; but the question is an American one.

Speeches recently made at the National Conference of Social Work held in St. Louis, denouncing segregation of the Japanese is a pitiable example of superficial knowledge creating wrong conclusions.

The speech of a Mr. Powell of Poston, Arizona, moved the Los Angeles Times to a scathing editorial denouncing his words and opinions. He is described as assistant chief of community service in that city and stated, in his speech, that the Japanese "were not and are not dangerous" and that the only reason they were moved out of California is that California coveted their property. The Times editorial states (quote) that if this Powell believes what he says he is unfit to hold the post he does; if he doesn't he should be fired for lying" (end of quote.)

The editorial met a strong response in California and elsewhere from straight thinking people.

During World War I, I was engaged in Americanization work in Washington as member of a committee of citizens which had opened an office there in order to co-operate closely with Secretary Lane of the Department of the Interior. We operated under the auspices of the U.S. Bureau of education in formulating a program for the assimilation of the foreign born population and to arouse interest and secure support in the various states for a unified system of education of the foreign born.

(2)

We had access to any and all of the large industries employing foreign labor.

Connected with the committee was a man of the Mr. Powell quality. The kind which in the words of the Los Angeles Times editorial "repeats a familiar and silly charge uttered by individuals of the ultra sentimental type". This member of the committee was in a position of authority.

The correspondence which he received and sent out on committee matters came across my desk as mine did across his. It became increasingly noticeable that invitations for dinners, banquets, teas, etcetera were being extended to him by prominent Japanese residing in New York city. He attended these functions as an honored guest, was obviously impressed by the gracious hospitality of his hosts, and by their culture, their deference and their intelligent understanding and appreciation of the objective of our committee, and he deprecated the exclusion from citizenship of people of such superior culture, for at that time Japanese were not admitted to citizenship.

The series of softening entertaining continued with excellent results, for shortly the names of two of these Japanese gentlemen were included in the membership of the committee.

I protested, not because of racial prejudice, but it was, to my mind, both illogical and inconsistent to place any one but citizens upon a committee organized to formulate a national program policy in education. My protest had no effect. In fact, my attitude was considered lacking in the broad essentials of the brotherhood of man and international unity.

Following the appointment of the Japanese upon the committee letters were received from these gentlemen requesting that they have the privilege of going through the Bethlehem steel plant.

Again I protested but to no avail. However, a pass to go into the plant could not be issued by our committee but by the War Department

(3)  
only and a letter of refusal accompanied by an inquiry from the War Department was received in reply by the United States Commissioner of Education, under whose auspices our committee operated,

At about this time in 1917, I was in New York city in interview with Colonel Theodore Roosevelt concerning the program of our committee, as he was deeply interested in a national program being enacted to Americanize the unassimilated foreign born population; and he said to me during this interview, that he considered Americanization second only to winning the war, in importance.

When looking over the membership of the committee, he paused when he came to the two Japanese members. With his finger pointing to the names he inquired, what these Japanese men were doing on this committee. "Take them off" he said emphatically. "Cannot be quoted but the Japanese in the Pacific is our next menace."

Those of us of his generation are aware, that his unique experience in negotiating peace terms between Russia and Japan in the Portsmouth treaty of 1905, was conducive to his first hand understanding of the Japanese. How right he was as expressed in those unforgettable words to me, in 1917 we of this generation now know. Over twenty five years have passed since that interview and I feel free, under the present situation, to quote him and I believe that he would have it so.

During these same days, Mr. Raymond B. Price, vice president of the United States Rubber Company, who was located in Washington, handed me a letter with the translation, which had come to his hand. It was written by a Japanese official, in which we their "neighbors" were referred to as "the great American booby," This at the time let us recall, when Japan was a professed ally.

The American people, the Powells and their soft ilk had better wake up to the fact that this is not a war of sentimentality; but a

(4)

cold calculating, brutish, bloodswimming reality and that if ever straight thinking was required of the American people IT IS NOW.

The subtlety of the Japanese their ideology bred from the instilled belief of centuries that they are superbeings, descended from the Sun Goddess which their Emperor personifies, motivates thinking and acts and creates in them an unyielding determination to conquer and contempt for the American.

It is an utterly foreign language of philosophy and psychology to the American, whose forthrightness in speech, opinions and actions undoubtedly brands him as a 'booby' in the eyes of the Japanese.

Americans must accept as a fact that Japanese culture cultivates to commandeer for the purposes of conquest. We would be indeed the American booby, if we expected this instilled culture of centuries to be dissolved by a few or even many years of living amongst us, observing and partaking to a certain extent in our American way of life.

I have no racial antagonism as such; but I recognize that the spiritual and mental quality of free men, ready to labor for and to sacrifice for the ideal of freedom is a matter of involvement where past culture has not retarded growth to a higher concept.

The Japanese have proven themselves incapable of being a part of a society of nations. That they are Orientals is not the question. The challenge of the Orient to the Occident has been given by Mme Chiang Kai-shek who exemplifies, the inextinguishable virtues of an Oriental culture that produces wisdom.

She has electrified and aroused the American people to not only a point of appreciation but of comprehension that no other force has been capable of exciting. We are a wider visioned, less provincial people because of her being in our midst. She has conferred the Oriental blessing of wisdom upon the west.

(5)

Her American education contributed to an expansion of knowledge. The integration of this knowledge comes from something deeper in her than the west could give.

A proof of what the American way of life does for the individual was shown in the apprehension of Americans of the qualities which Mrs. Chiang Kai-shek expressed.

If American perception is sharpened to the point of estimating values as indicated in the response to what Mrs. Chiang Kai-shek said and what she did, we can safely go on with this war for freedom.

No one should have the temerity to advocate a change of policy at this time, regarding the internment of Japanese residents. If loyal Nisei are in relocation camps they have a grand chance to prove their loyalty. It is their contribution to the war effort and their sacrifice. We are not taking chances, in this war.

The possibility of institutionalizing the youth in relocation camps was expressed here recently by Mrs. Roosevelt on one of her flying trips to a camp. Institutionalizing takes time, years. And we must not overlook that Japanese citizenship permitted in this country does not abrogate citizenship in Japan. It is dual citizenship.

Realizing that the Japanese can, as Californians say they can, raise two blades of grass where one grew before, I would not have this proficiency employed at this time, with the dangers which might ensue, in any different way than it is now utilized in the relocation camps.

I saw too much of fifth column work, called peaceful penetration, during World War I. to allow such policies to be broadcasted without a broad cast in opposition.

With almost unanimity of opinion, the people of California have shown their confidence in General Dewitt. He has magnificently done a tremendously difficult task. I feel sure that he feels as long as we have a General Mainwright prisoner on soil he was sent to protect as an American.

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soldier and hears General MacArthur's plea for help across the Pacific and while American people are mourning the execution of our son's of the air, that the Mr. Powells and other soft minded people in this country will have to await the outcome of this war before a change is made in relocation of the Japanese in camps.

They are humanely treated. It may not be the ultimate of perfection in all provisions; but they can work and study and play and be with their families. They do not face death in outposts, disease, physical handicap for life and torture.

In my seven years of living in California I have seen enough to cause me to realize that wisdom, not boobyism, is the requisite in dealing with the Japanese and a condition here on the coast which has been permitted to develop.

It is heartening to hear a clarion call, rising above the confused din caused by the uninformed sentimentalists, in the statement of Leon Hoppell, State Commander of the American Legion, who without criticism or rancor said in Fresno recently "We feel control of the Japanese evacuated from the Pacific coast should be in the hands of the Army. This is no reflection upon the work of the Relocation Authorities but we believe that because of the complex problems caused by these Orientals the Army should handle the job".

and he concluded by saying that the Legion will endeavor to enlighten the people of this country on the situation which confronts us with the Japanese and suggested that they could be moved to mandated islands after the war.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

April 2, 1947

Brigadier General William J. Donovan,  
Director, Office of Strategic Services  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel:

I think that, under the present circumstances, my services are more urgently needed elsewhere than by you. I am, accordingly, asking permission to return to private practice presently.

I value highly the opportunity of having been able to serve under your leadership. I regret the necessity for leaving your service, and am sure that, though I am going back to private practice, I am subject to your call for any special assignment which may be required.

Respectfully, yours,

*Geo. H. Brown*

George H. Brown



*Please deliver to Mr. Bliss*  
*x (cash)*

May 8, 1943

Chairman, Local Board, No. 260  
 Selective Service, System  
 136-50 Roosevelt Avenue  
 Flushing, New York

Dear Sir:

Mr. Howard Huntington Bliss, an employee of this Agency, is registered with your Board under Order No. 11893A. It is my understanding that he is classified 3-A under the Selective Service Regulations, he is 40 years old, and therefore beyond the age at which men are being called.

The Office of Strategic Services is actively engaged in the war effort as is apparent from the attached copy of the Military Order establishing this organization. We desire to send Mr. Bliss to Cairo, Egypt, to perform important duties for this office. Before he can obtain a passport, it will be necessary for your Board to issue him a permit to leave the country. Please send the permit directly to Mr. Frederick Ocasner, c/o Office of Strategic Services, 25th & E Streets, N. W., Washington, D.C. As long as registrant is in our employ, he may at all times be reached through this office.

I will appreciate your expediting the issuance of this permit in order that Mr. Bliss may follow pre-arranged schedules for departure.

Very truly yours,

WILLIAM J. DONOVAN  
 Director

1 Incl.  
 Copy Executive Order,  
 CS3, June 13/42

Confidential LT 11/24/1

SECRET

April 9, 1943.

Major Livermore

Mr. Brennan

Temporary Loan of Commissioned Officer to Major Livermore

In accordance with your desire expressed this morning, to have one commissioned officer from my Section accompany your interviewing group, I am confirming the oral arrangement made at noon today. As you know, in my Section we only have two commissioned Army officers, First Lieutenant Coniglio and Second Lieutenant Magiari. We are glad to loan First Lieutenant Coniglio to you for whatever period of time you may deem necessary, starting Sunday or Monday next, to complete the trip which you discussed with us.

Copies to: General Donovan  
Mr. Shapiro

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

DATE

FROM

TO

✓

April 10, 1943

To: W.O.  
From: [unclear]  
Re: Captain [unclear] Blockhaus

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## OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

## OFFICE MEMORANDUM

DATE MAR 25 1947

TO: Colonel William J. Donovan  
 FROM: F. L. Mayer  
 SUBJECT: Attached Report re Captain J. Blokhuis

Herewith, a memorandum regarding the experiences and sentiments of a Dutch officer, whom our Mr. Borst interviewed recently in Guelph, Canada.

Mr. Shepardson and I are of the opinion that if this report could be properly edited into article form, it could be published by the Saturday Evening Post, Reader's Digest, or a similar magazine, after clearance had been obtained from the Netherlands Military Mission, with whom I am in touch.

Please let me know your views and I'll proceed accordingly.

  
 F.L.M.

Attachment

*Handwritten notes:*  
 No more  
 with  
 the report

CAPTAIN J. BLOKHUIS

Captain Blokhuis was a professional officer in the Netherlands Army up until the end of 1926. Through a prematurely exploding hand-grenade, he lost his left eye and was pensioned and put on the reserve list in 1927. He then established himself in business in Brussels, Belgium, as the representative of the United States firm of Celotex.

When the War broke out in September, 1939, he went back to the Hague and offered his services to the War Department. He was accepted and became an Adjutant (Captain) on the staff of General Winkelman, Commander-in-Chief of the Netherlands Army.

After the Invasion and consequent surrender of the Netherlands, he was demobilized and in July, 1940, returned to Brussels and continued to represent Celotex up until his escape from Belgium in July, 1942.

He arrived in Canada with Mrs. Blokhuis in January, 1943 and rejoined the Netherlands forces at Guelph right away. As he has only one eye, he is an officer with a limited duty classification (Captain) and expects and hopes to be sent to be sent to Charlottesville, Virginia to follow the course in military administration of occupied territories.

Captain and Mrs. Blokhuis had a house in Brussels and a small country home ~~in~~ Ardennes in the neighborhood of Namur and through their association with both city and country people during two years of German occupation (July 1940 to July 1942), they were able to form a very accurate over-all picture as to the effects of Allied psychological warfare on the Belgian population.

Before Captain Blokhuis began to tell about his experiences, he impressed on me that I should try to put myself in the place of the average middle-class Belgian, somebody who has not had a square meal for eighteen months and whose main meal consists again and again of from one to two potatoes, five or six beans and a glass of water. A man whose children are always hungry and ask for food which is impossible to get, whose babies need milk which is very seldom to be had (and if it is available, has been deprived of its fat contents and tastes like rubber). A man whose hopes have been raised again and again by optimistic Allied radio forecasts and, which is worse, who again and again saw these hopes scattered by news reports contradictory to the previous optimistic propaganda.

In short, a man whose little world has crumbled to pieces, and who now fully understands the meaning of the phrase "struggle for existence".

Captain Blokhuis said that this may sound dramatic, but then well-fed and free people should realize that there is nothing more dramatic and demoralizing for a man than to see his children go hungry, and being unable to do anything about it.

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(Captain J. Blokhuis)

The average Belgian family man today has only one interest in life, namely, to obtain enough food to keep his family and himself from starvation. The Allies should realize that a man with under-fed and sickly children is totally disinterested in any kind of "pep talks" which come over Allied radios, advising him to keep his chin up, to commit sabotage, to prepare for the day of invasion, etc., etc.

The biggest mistake ever made in psychological warfare was committed by the B.B.C.'s Colonel Britten when he formed his "V for Victory Legion".

Captain and Mrs. Blokhuis, together with eighteen Belgian and Dutch friends, all gathered around the radio on the evening that the Colonel was to make his "important announcement". Everybody had been guessing for days what the announcement would be, and one could feel the tension in the air wherever one went. When the Colonel said: "Herewith, I make all the people in Belgium, Holland, etc. members of the 'V for Victory Legion', and when I come on the air again, it will be for the purpose of giving you definite instructions about the approaching invasion", - the eighteen guests of Captain Blokhuis (all well-to-do people) stood up and, without saying a word, made the "V for Victory" sign. Some of the men cried like children, as everybody felt sure that the hour of liberation was near. Good will toward England soared sky high and the next morning, one heard people laughing wherever one went. A few days passed, a week passed, two weeks passed and finally the Colonel came on the air again. People had invited their closest friends for dinner, at which a last bottle of wine and the last carefully hoarded can of vegetables or fruit was served. Everyone was so excited that they could hardly speak. Finally, the Colonel came on, and not a word was said about the pending invasion, just the ordinary pep-talk. Captain Blokhuis said that nobody can describe the utter disappointment of the people. Three of Captain Blokhuis' guests fainted, and the rest just sat and stared in front of them without saying a word. An ex-Belgian Officer sobbed like a child. The next day the populace in the streets looked miserable and said that British propaganda was just the same as the German; you could not believe either one.

In the weeks following, no more mention was made over the B.B.C. about the forthcoming invasion, and people stopped listening to English broadcasts. Around that time, good will toward America was steadily increasing and, after America entered the War, the United States broadcasts from Boston were becoming very popular. However, the drawback of the Boston broadcasts is that they are very hard to get, as very few people in Belgium have short wave reception facilities.



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(Captain Blokhuis)

Captain Blokhuis is under the impression that if the United States Government could set up a station of their own somewhere in England, its broadcasts would be the most popular in Belgium and Holland.

Before the Captain left Belgium, his closest friends who knew about his plans, begged him to tell the English and Americans to please drop some food for the children over Belgium. Nothing would encourage and strengthen the morale of the people more than to see that the Allies were interested in the welfare of the future generation of Belgium.

Captain Blokhuis said that he realized that the American and British General Staff will immediately try to kill this plan by saying that it does away with the effectiveness of the blockade. But in that case, why can coffee, tea and cigarettes be dropped over Holland, apparently without seriously offsetting the effects of the blockade? Furthermore, coffee, tea and cigarettes are for grown-up people, which would make its bad effect, if any, on the blockade worse. He said that it should be remembered that the Allies tried so hard to establish good will among the conquered nations, why waste time on people who can not physically and mentally cope with pep-talks any more? Psychological warfare will be less and less effective as people get more hungry, and what useful purpose can be served by finally liberating a completely demoralized, under-fed, disinterested country? As long as the Allies hope for strong aid from the conquered peoples when the invasion begins, present wishes of these peoples should be considered if that is at all possible. His hope is that the man who has the final word on whether or not food for children should be dropped, should endeavor to put himself in the place of a father with hungry children, or starve himself for about a week before making his final decision.

To illustrate the state of mind of hungry people, Captain Blokhuis gave the following example, and it should be remembered that he is a member of the well-to-do and well educated class: When Christmas, 1941, came along, the total hoarded food supply in the Blokhuis home consisted of a small can of pineapple and a can of sardines. After a long talk, it was decided that the can of pineapple should be the "piece de resistance" of the Christmas dinner together with four potatoes, half a cabbage, a loaf of ersatz bread and some wine. (The house was stone cold as coal could not be bought at any price, the winter having been exceptionally cold.) During this excellent Christmas dinner, it was decided that the can of sardines would be opened four months later in April, to celebrate the occasion of their twenty-fifth wedding anniversary. From that moment on, Captain Blokhuis stated that he had sardines on his mind and when the food supply, thanks to the extreme cold, became worse and worse in January and February, he and Mrs. Blokhuis would often seriously

- 4 -

(Captain Blokhuis)

discuss whether or not they would eat the sardines right away. He impressed the seriousness of the fact on me that a six foot, four and one half inch man could be brought to a state of mind where a tin of sardines was so important that he could not think of anything else.

In that extremely cold winter of 1941-42, "black market" operations were practically nil as food simply was not available. Vegetables and potatoes were frozen and were never on the market. The bread looked and tasted like putty, and no stomach could digest it for any length of time. It also should not be forgotten that the black market's customers are only the wealthy. If, in America, eggs would sell for one dollar apiece, a chicken for fifteen dollars (potatoes, butter, milk, etc. in the same proportion), one hundred and twenty eight million people could die of starvation simply because the average man could not afford to pay such prices. The fact that one can buy meat, eggs, chicken, butter and cheese on a black market in an occupied country does not mean at all that the population is really not as badly off as we are made to believe.

All the broadcasts from the B.B.C., Radio Orange, Radio Brandaris (since merged with Radio Orange) were mediocre. They tried to cheer the people up and had a very strong tendency to be over-optimistic and to resemble the German propaganda broadcasts to a certain degree (keeping the bad news hidden). Everybody is sick and tired of anything that even only faintly resembles propaganda, and even the very clever and well worded German propaganda has hardly any effect any more. People do like to listen to news broadcasts, but they have to be absolutely correct, otherwise it is better not to have them at all. A news broadcast stating: "Today the RAF bombed the shipyards at X, and they were completely destroyed." sounds fine and is fine if the statement is true. However, if the Belgians who live a few hundred yards from these shipyards know that, except for a crater on the road leading to the yards, no damage whatsoever was done, statements like these act as a boomerang, and people rapidly lose confidence in all news-casts. On days that there is no news, it should be stated, as people much prefer this to wild forecasts of events which may or may not happen. Here Captain Blokhuis repeated that an American station broadcasting from England could do wonders by just employing this technique.

As for King Leopold of the Belgians, Captain Blokhuis stated that he definitely is not popular with the average Belgian, and the announcement of his marriage to Miss Baels (apparently his former mistress) was very badly received. Immediately after the announcement, was made, portraits of Astrid appeared in shop windows and in the windows,

- 5 -

(Captain Blokhuis)

and in the windows of private homes, - not just in isolated cases but hundreds of them all over Brussels.

The behavior of the German Army of Occupation is only on the surface correct. Right after the invasion, a few German soldiers were shot as an example of what would happen to any German who would steal anything from the conquered peoples, however, a few months later, the German Army entered upon the official systematic looting campaign and by the middle of last year, Belgium had been emptied. Houses of people who had fled to France, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, etc. were systematically emptied by the Army. Nothing except the walls was left. Even the doors were taken away. As reason for this plunder, it was said that the owners of these houses were apparently anti-German as they had preferred to leave the country instead of staying and helping to build up a greater Reich. Therefore, their belongings were legal "war bounty". Cases were known to Captain Blokhuis of people who returned to their homesteads and found them empty. They right away went to the military authorities to find out what had happened to their belongings, or to put in a claim for payment. Without exception, the Gestapo arrested these people and sent them to a concentration camp "as they had proven to be enemies of the German Reich by fleeing from the country." A still easier way out was to simply tell them they had "Communist tendencies" and send them to Germany.

Captain Blokhuis, on various occasions, received notices ordering him, for instance, to bring his car to a certain barrack where it would be inspected and, if approved, evaluated and confiscated; or to bring his spare tires to a certain collection depot; or to bring all the carpenter implements he possessed to a certain police station; or to deposit all the steel and brass door handles at a certain post office, etc., etc.

When he received his first notice (concerning the car), he found out that a lot of people that did not have cars also received such notices. He and Mrs. Blokhuis then decided not to comply with the order in question or with any future orders and risk taking the consequences, if any. Non-compliance with any of the orders within twenty four hours always entailed enormous fines and/or long prison terms and/or death penalty for non-cooperation with the German military authorities.

People all over Brussels right away brought their cars to the designated barracks, but Captain Blokhuis sat tight and hoped for the best. However, he heard nothing more about it and, consequently, he continued to ignore all the next orders covering other articles.

- 5 -

(Captain Blokhuis)

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(Captain Blokhuis)

Some people who disregarded other orders, after having complied with the first one, ~~would~~ receive prison terms, fines and in one or two cases, were executed. It proves that the German administration, military as well as civil, has successfully built up a reputation of ruthlessness which, as far as they are concerned, functions wonderfully and simplifies its work. The infinitesimal percentage of people, who successfully disregard confiscation orders, has no effect on the nearly one hundred percent favorable results, and consequently no valuable time is lost to investigate. This is Captain Blokhuis' opinion, and it sounds sensible.

In conclusion, Captain Blokhuis stated that no one that has not actually seen it can form an idea how completely successful the systematic German plunder in Belgium has been. It will take years to bring conditions back to a state resembling normal after the War.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

DATE

TO:

FROM:

SUBJECT

*W. Shapiro*

SECRET

SERVICES

B. E. 14013

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

March 19, 1943

MEMORANDUM

To: Colonel William J. Donovan  
From: Lt. Commander R. Davis Halliwell  
Subject: Major Bartholomew Bouverie

Major Bouverie took it upon himself today to make inquiry on the subject of Felix Guepin, which query he states was originated by his home office, as to why the British Passport Control officer had issued a passport to this subject.

He further stated that this man was under surveillance in London and the inquiry by his home office was made as to whether he was doing undercover work in the British Isles.

A similar inquiry was made to Mr. Shepherdson through Tony Moore.

The writer informed Major Bouverie that this man was on the business of his company in transit to another locality and that to the best of the writer's knowledge and belief, not doing any undercover work in England, and that if he were so discovered, it seemed to me that the English were in the position of acting as they saw fit. I further stated that on arrival at his ultimate destination, where his visit was probably of short duration, the subject would carry on his business, but might gain impressions which might be useful to us and we hoped to gain any general information obtained.

Another alarming part of this matter, however, is that Miss Pauline Curtis was the person in my section to whom the original inquiry was directed,



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and when asked in effect "do you have a man by the name of Felix Guepin?" she answered the question in such a way, referring to me, which led Bouverie to the deduction he had some connection with us.

I remonstrated with Major Bouverie as to the technique he used in directing his queries to a secretary in my office, and told him we would not tolerate any such procedure hereafter.

Bouverie admitted his error, apologized profusely, but I believe this factual record of the occurrence should be made known for your information and the record.

  
R. Davis Halliwell  
Lt. Commander, USNR  
Deputy Chief, SO

March 17, 1943

MEMORANDUM

From: Colonel Donovan

To: Mr. William J. Griffin, Jr.  
PW Staff

Thank you for your note on Joe Berg. It sounds good, and I think he ought to be of use.

W.J.D.

May 22, 1943

Mr. William W. Leary  
Director  
U. S. Selective Service Headquarters  
2227 K Street, N. W.  
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Leary:

Mr. Beverley M. Bowie, Local Draft Board No. 17, 100 - 15th Street, S. E., Order No. 1148, a member of the staff of the Office of Strategic Services, has been ordered to report for induction into the army on May 25.

Mr. Bowie is engaged in important work which would be definitely facilitated by a commission. At our request and in order better to enable him to carry on his work, he made first application for a Navy commission on March 9 through this office, and on April 1 received notice that his papers had gone to the Navy Department in Arlington. It is presumed that his commission will be granted shortly, and I am accordingly asking a six week postponement of induction. It is understood, of course, that, if his commission fails to materialize within that time, he would be available for induction on July 6.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan,  
Director

May 20, 1943

Local Draft Board No. 1  
110 - 15th Street, N. W.  
Washington, D. C.

Gentlemen:

Mr. Beverley S. Bowie, Order No. 1448, a member of the staff of the Office of Strategic Services, has been ordered to report for induction into the Army on May 25.

Mr. Bowie is engaged in important work which could be interrupted by his induction into the Army. It is requested that you make every effort to enable him to carry on his work as long as possible. First, a letter from the Navy Commission on March 10, 1943, and on April 1, 1943, received notice that his report had been sent to the Navy Department in Washington. It is presumed that his commission will be signed shortly, and accordingly, asking for a six week postponement of induction. It is understood that, if the postponement is granted, his induction will be for induction on July 6.

Sincerely yours,

Walter J. Donovan,  
Director

March 9, 1943

From: The Director of Strategic Services  
To: The Chief of Naval Personnel

Subject: Beverly M. Bowie

1. Mr. Beverly M. Bowie is applying for a commission in the U. S. Naval Reserve. He is employed in the Office of Strategic Services.

2. He is hereby released for service with the Armed Forces.

3. His application for appointment is approved, and he is to be certified and ordered to the Office of Strategic Services for assignment.

4. Mr. Bowie is recommended as being qualified under Naval Reserve No. 18-42.

5. The fitness of Mr. Bowie's duties will be such as to prevent any non-organic physical condition from being a hindrance, if required, as stated.

Very truly yours,

Director of Strategic Services,  
Washington, D. C.

Edward J. Donovan  
Director

## OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

## INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Colonel William J. Donovan  
FROM: William L. Langer  
SUBJECT: Bomb Damage Work in London

DATE: March 5, 1943

I am sending you herewith a memorandum prepared by Alfred Kalenbaum on the general problem of bomb damage assessment. I am sure that you will be interested in knowing the way this is being handled in England and I am also sure that you will recognize the great importance of services of this type in the period to come.

*William L. Langer*  
William L. Langer  
Director, Branch of  
Research and Analysis

February 23, 1943

SECRET

AFIO 145

# SO B DANCE ASSESSEMENT WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON AREA RAIDS

## A. The Importance of the Bombing Program

Area raids by the RAF on Germany are continuing and will probably expand. These will be accompanied by attacks by the light air force, presumably of an area and precision nature. As is known, present expectations are that the scale of effort will be significantly increased. Indeed, such bombing may constitute one of the most important forms of offensive action against Germany during 1943.

### General Points

It will be obvious, therefore, that the need for a continued effort to locate and identify the targets of the RAF is of the utmost importance. Such information is of the greatest value to the RAF and to the German Air Force. It is of the greatest value to the RAF and to the German Air Force. It is of the greatest value to the RAF and to the German Air Force.

It will be obvious, therefore, that the need for a continued effort to locate and identify the targets of the RAF is of the utmost importance. Such information is of the greatest value to the RAF and to the German Air Force. It is of the greatest value to the RAF and to the German Air Force.

It is certain that the experience of the RAF in Germany cannot be considered as an example for Germany. German houses -- the



2. Most striking is the information now available on the effectiveness of raids, as measured by the tonnage actually falling into target areas. All previous indications of this tonnage are exaggerated, at least for the bombing campaign carried on from January, 1942. The actual percentage of tonnage delivered which falls into the administrative areas is much smaller than is usually indicated. (A recent estimate for the first week of heavy bombing for the week ending February 10, 1942, was below 10 percent. Official statements have been given of 20 percent, and the actual percentage is 100 percent.)

3. The evidence is also available to the Government that the damage to the industrial base of the enemy is much less than is usually indicated. (The evidence for this is given in the report of the Committee on the Bombing of Japan, dated February 10, 1942) has been

- 3 -

040247

restored; housing reconstruction has been well on its way; there is extensive use of workers' barracks, which are prefabricated and can be readily assembled; destruction of certain structures which would appear to be not very important to the conduct of the war, i.e., churches, appears to have been made.

Despite the fact that such information is now becoming available, it is certain that it is not coming to the attention of those who should be immediately concerned. This stems from the facts that: (1) the role of labor and reconstruction has not been clearly reported in official reports; (2) the scale of reconstruction has had to be restricted for political reasons, with the result that the correct information is usually available only in confidential sources; (3) complete reconstruction is not being carried out in all areas; those areas which are being reconstructed are not really being reconstructed; (4) reconstruction is mainly in the form of temporary structures; (5) the results are not satisfactory; (6) the material resources available for reconstruction are not being used to the best advantage.

#### Reconstruction Work

1. The reconstruction work is being carried out in a haphazard manner. The arrangements for reconstruction are not being made in a systematic manner. The work is being carried out in a piecemeal manner. The work is being carried out in a piecemeal manner.

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SECRET

United States in any reasonable period, since it is extremely difficult to send all the pertinent photographic material overseas.

This personnel will facilitate adoption of the program. But for the program to work effectively, interest in obtaining the correct information must be expressed by those high up in our intelligence agencies. Pressure must be brought to bear upon those responsible for the working in order that they cooperate in providing information which will permit objective portrayal of the situation.

*W. Fred McLaughlin*

cc/Capt  
Gates, B.S.  
Fairbank  
Kilgour

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

February 19, 1943

Mr. Gordon T. Bowles  
c/o Mr. Paul Bunker  
Office of War Information  
American Legation  
New Delhi, India

Dear Mr. Bowles:

In accordance with permission granted by the Board of Economic Warfare, you are hereby designated a representative of the Interdepartmental Committee for the Acquisition of Foreign Publications. As a representative of the Committee you are authorized to make expenditures on behalf of the Committee for the purchase of graphic materials bearing on the war effort that you may be able to locate during your travels through Iran, Afghanistan, India, China, and other Asiatic countries. In connection with obtaining Chinese materials, you will work closely with Mr. John K. Fairbank, who is the Interdepartmental Committee's representative at Chungking, China.

You will also make arrangements for shipping to the Interdepartmental Committee in Washington all publications that you may purchase for the Committee, and you may make expenditures on behalf of the Committee in order to effect transportation of these graphic materials to Washington. In connection with your performance of these activities it is expected that you will retain receipts to be released to Mr. John K. Fairbank in Chungking, who will reimburse you. If you retain these receipts until you return to Washington, please turn them over to Mr. Frederick G. Kilgour, the Executive Secretary of the Interdepartmental Committee, and he will make arrangements for reimbursing you. Should it be necessary for you to use Board of Economic Warfare funds for the purchase of graphic materials for the Interdepartmental Committee, the Committee will of course reimburse the Board of Economic Warfare according to the provisions of Section 601 of the Economic Act.

The total of the expenditures authorized in the above two paragraphs is not to exceed one thousand dollars without further authorization from this office.

Very truly yours,

William J. Donovan

Boddy RUC 10, 6 3/4

Zanuck

Ham Signal Corp

Kenn K

T. J. Pro

February 26, 1945

MEMORANDUM

FOR: Commander Ford

FROM: Colonel Donovan

The following is a quotation from Colonel Zanuck relative to Lieutenant Kenneth Pier:

Your cameraman, especially Lieutenant Kenneth Pier, were of tremendous assistance to the Signal Corps in this undertaking.

Pier was very careful in any ways other than photography. He was the first two to arrive in Sicily at the commencement of the battle, and without him my work could certainly have suffered.

While I had difficulty in Tunisia in keeping tabs on all of the various Signal Corps cameramen, I never had any great difficulty in finding Pier, or keeping him on the job - he was always at the front in the very thick of things.

February 15, 1943

From: The Director of Strategic Services  
 To: The Chief of Naval Personnel  
 Subject: Naval M. Bowers

1. Mr. Naval M. Bowers is hereby recommended for commission in the Naval Reserve.

2. Mr. Bowers is employed in this office. He is hereby released for service with the Armed Forces.

3. It is found that Mr. Bowers possesses the qualifications required by the Navy Department, it is recommended that he be commissioned and assigned to the Office of Strategic Services for duty.

4. The services of this individual as an officer are required for use of the nature of the work he will perform. His work will involve secret and confidential matters which make it most desirable that he be a commissioned officer.

William J. Donovan  
 Director



SECRET

Mr. William A. Mitchell

February 24, 1945

Lt. Duncan C. Lee

Mr. Jose Bensaude

1. Mr. Jose Bensaude is a Portuguese national with whom OSS has had some dealings during the past year in connection with a proposition whereby the U. S. Maritime Commission was to transfer to him a merchant ship under its control. Through no fault of Mr. Bensaude's, this transaction was never completed and the ship was not transferred.

2. Mr. Bensaude is now applying to the State Department for an exit permit and re-entry permit covering a proposed trip to Portugal. There are indications that the State Department is not likely to grant these permits. Mr. Bensaude, or his attorney Mr. Walter H. Hoyer, received this information from Mr. Hoyer, of the State Department.

3. Mr. Bensaude is afraid that the State Department is adopting this attitude because of a misunderstanding of his intentions. He is afraid that the State Department is afraid that the transaction was never completed and that the reasons which reflect upon him. He has therefore requested that the State Department be informed that this was not the case. Major Hoyer believes that the State Department is not likely to grant this point. He does not believe that we should do more, i.e., make any representations as to Bensaude's good character or request the State Department to grant him the permit to go to Portugal.

4. It will be readily appreciated if the State Department is not likely to grant the permit to go to Portugal.

Colonel Donovan  
Colonel Buxton

SECRET

San Moody, Esq.  
Attorney at Law  
Austin, Texas

My dear Mr. Woody:

is a result of your letter of 8 August, General Donovan (in whose absence your letter has been referred to me for reply) asked that a review be made of the file of Pvt. Charles L. Black Jr. and that he be interviewed again. We are at present trying to arrange with the Army for an interview with Pvt. Black. His case will be given every possible consideration, though the question of using him in this organization depends on whether his particular qualifications are suited for the very few vacancies of a highly specialized nature which may exist.

\* Yours very truly,

For the Director,

W. C. Locking, Jr.  
Major, USA,  
Chief, Secretariat.

Will I Burtin -

Genuine I long ago  
 & give me a paper  
 on Psychological Warfare  
 in N.A. is it really  
 Can you tell it -

So the attached  
 the paper is in  
 an appendix to the

# OFFICE MEMORANDUM

Date: Feb. 2, 1943

As the Army Officer I will endeavor to ascertain from the Messrs. Quartermaster the immediate needs that can be supplied by CMA, and therefore any supporting needs from this same view. I have no illusion about waiting, in on General M to get the answers but will be with every staff officer and any fighting colonels whose needs can be translated into things that we can do.

[illegible]

But the doctor's second concern will be the  
 timing of the trip. Moreover, in order to get the  
 patient out of the clinic as fast as possible, the  
 doctor will, of course, be the ruling factor  
 in the decision.

The population will be with the populations, and the population will be with the populations. There are big and small populations, and they can be found to be ready to.


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Col. Donovan

-2-

Feb. 5, 1945

Certainly the theatre commander will be pleased to  
 discuss the situation. With regard to the military situation, it  
 may be necessary to discuss the requirements to you, perhaps the  
 first, and perhaps in sudden volume.

  
 John L. Horn

# SECRET

February 2, 1943.

## DIRECTIVE

From: Director, Strategic Services  
To: Major Leber Blankenhorn

1. You are hereby authorized and directed to proceed from Washington, D. C. to Algiers, and such other places in North Africa as may be required to perform your duties.

2. You will report to Colonel William A. Eddy, U.S.A., at Algiers, Director of U.S.C. activities in North Africa. Your specific assignment will be to plan and prepare psychological warfare (MO) operations in and from North Africa. You will work generally under the supervision of Mr. John Whitaker upon his arrival at Algiers. You will also keep in mind that all U.S.C. activities and personnel are under the general supervision of the theater commander.

3. You are authorized to carry official documents and equipment of this office. Separate provisions will be made for Army travel needs.

William J. Donovan  
Director

# SECRET



OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

February 11, 1953

Prepared by A. JAMES SMITH:

Subject: Major Blain's report on his trip to North Africa  
(to serve as a basis for the Colonel's  
directive to Major Blain's report)

Major Blankenhorn is being sent by the OSS to North Africa to report on operations there, especially in the use of paratroops. The operations contemplated would be in North Africa insofar as they were related to the greater campaign. Usually as important would be the report Blankenhorn's exploration of the use of paratroops in such reports possible operations in South Africa.

[illegible]



February 1, 1943.

MEMORANDUM

FROM: James H. Murphy

TO: Colonel John Nash

1. Will you please have prepared the necessary requests to the Adjutant General for travel orders for the following officers:

- (1) Major William Blankenhorn, 0505352, A.U. 138
- (2) Major John J. Weaver, 0900703, GSO.

Both of these officers should be ordered to proceed from Washington, D. C. to Africa to report to Colonel William A. Gandy, U.S.A., for duty.

In the case of Major Blankenhorn, his orders should be in the form of a transfer to the North African Theater. In the case of Major Weaver, he should be ordered to North Africa on temporary duty and to return to Washington, D. C. upon the completion of his tour.

55 Wall Street  
New York City

January 19, 1943

Dear Bill:

There is a man who is who you  
might call on for help. If I were you, I'd call  
him. I am asking him to send you to see you "back"  
Carter (Lieut. Col.) our man: I'd like to see you  
on one air com. He can tell you how to go  
about it, whom to talk to, etc.

Sincerely,

(Signature)

For information

103-1000000

103-1000000

103-1000000

(103-1000000)

only read the list of names

now read the first names

you can see the names

can see the names

now to go

about it

when to read

55 WALL STREET  
NEW YORK

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the

*[Handwritten signature]*

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO : [illegible]  
FROM : [illegible]  
SUBJECT : [illegible]

DATE: 11/11/47

A.

11/11/47

February 13, 1943

MEMORANDUM

From: Colonel Donovan  
To: Colonel Goodell

Please tell Bill Kimbel what you have  
done about Theresa Conney.

W.J.D.



COLONEL GOODFELLOW

WILLIAM A. KIMBLE

FEBRUARY 1, 1973

Pursuant to your conversation this morning and to avoid possible conflicting action, I suggest that it is an understanding of Colonel Monovack's instructions that I pursue the Teresa Bonney matter at the Department of State with the view to counteracting their present misunderstanding of the facts.

The initiation of any parallel conversations at State could, in my opinion, cause serious confusion to aggravate the present minor difficulties. If you do not concur, please advise.

Date Feb. 3th

Colonel Donovan

I believe this was taken care  
of by Colonel Buxton's memo  
to you on the subject - unless  
there is something further you  
wish me to do on the matter.

Secretariat



3500

Downloaded by [Redacted] on [Redacted]

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100-443887-100

1. The first part of the document is a letter from the President of the United States to the Congress, dated January 1, 1865. It is a very important document, as it is the first official communication from the President to the Congress since the Reconstruction era. The letter discusses the state of the Union and the progress of Reconstruction.

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
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
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/09/23 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100150008-0









On or about August 25th, she flew to Stockholm where she stayed at the Grand Hotel. First she got herself a secretary who went to see the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Then she got permits to photograph, started reading Finnish and Swedish newspapers and waited a week or two days to "smell" the Finnish city air. Over numerous Swedish officials and journalists who were old friends, she found out that the country was practically impossible to enter; that the army controlled entry and were keeping her out. She was aided by the Finnish consul by telling him that she wanted to see the photographs of refugee Finnish children who were in Sweden. He listened to her, he felt kind and he took her to the airport. He said it was impossible but once she agreed to let him take some photographs for her and visit. She learned that the American Consulate Intervention had let her visit. On September 1st, she returned to New York.

and covered in correct content in each - have 100%.

The children are very much interested in the Swedish people, and particularly in the Swedish people who have been living in America since the early days of settlement. The children are very much interested in the Swedish people who have been living in America since the early days of settlement.

c. Illegated French prisoners in Europe.

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

Miss Bonney also said that it would be very helpful for the United States to keep in close touch with three or four of the French diplomats at the French Legation who had access to the above information. One of these diplomats is named Jean Le Gey.

*[Faint, illegible handwritten notes]*

Credit section subject index

[illegible]

... and ... in ...

...in the very early in the Swedish schools. It  
...one professional lawyer in Sweden

- 6 -

who is pro-Nazi. There is an underground student group, however, combating the Nazi influence.

#### Food and Livestock Conditions.

Sweden is not being milked off food by Germany. It is, however, supplying Germany with obvious exports such as iron, steel, etc.

The Swedes are also taking a great deal of the fish obtained from the coast fisheries. Norway, starving, is very irritated at Sweden about this.

#### Attitude with Norway and Finland.

The Swedes feel badly for Norway, more because of racial affinity than anything else. While loyal to the Finns, the Swedes are not nearly so strong for the Finns as for Norway. Their feeling for the Finns is based on a more practical reason - they realize that Finland is a buffer against Russia.

The Swedes take care of thousands of Finnish children received from starving Finland. Some are taken out permanently, others for a year or shorter periods. Germany tries to build up racial antipathy toward Sweden within Finland, arising out of the fact that the smaller Finnish children lose their language and learn Swedish instead.

#### 6. Visit to Finland.

Upon arrival in Helsinki, Miss Bonney found out about the Propaganda Minister, Remper, being pro-Nazi so she kept away from him - her only contacts with him were formal. He told her that it was to the interests of Europe to have a greater Germany. She attended a pro-Nazi dinner at which this statement was made. She stayed at the Kemp Hotel and contacted numerous high officials and parliamentarians.

- 10 -

a. Visit to Karelian front.

After she had been there awhile the Finnish Headquarters advised her that orders had been sent through to provide her with a tour of the Karelian front. An itinerary was provided and she was placed in the hands of an officer from the Finnish Headquarters. She was given a large case of finest Marachels wines and liquors for entertainment purposes and toured the entire Karelian front. There she found that there were no Germans and that conditions were entirely static; that the Finnish have taken most of eastern Karelia; that the Finnish officers believe that they are not fighting an offensive war because the Americans have asked them not to, and that if they were to start such a war the Americans would declare war on Finland. For instance, the Finnish lines are close to the Murmansk railroad, and Miss Bonney feels that they could easily cut off this supply route if they wanted to. No one could understand why the Germans have not done this sooner.

Some of the Finnish officers, especially the younger ones, are pro-Nazi. They are particularly furious at the fact that we supply Russia with planes, arms, and ammunition. For instance, on a few occasions, American planes have flown over and killed Finnish soldiers with American-made bombs. This has not helped American relations any in the Finnish Army.

The German Army is located entirely on the northern Lapland front. The total strength of Finns and Germans is approximately equal, i.e.: 200,000 to 250,000 in each army. The Germans actually administer civilly the towns in Lapland, so that they control this part of Finland. The German army gets better food than the

- 12 -

Finnish Army. The Germans also control access to the Karelian front by requiring that a Finnish officer have a German military pass to get there. The Germans in Lapland have suffered to some extent from what is known as "Lapland sickness."

The Germans recognize now that they are unable to handle the terrain in Finland, and have great respect for the Finnish soldiers fighting in this type of terrain. It is generally conceded that the Finnish are the only people who can fight efficiently there. The Finns do not think much of the Germans now as military men or as organizers. The entire trip to the Karelian front took four or five days.

There are relatively few German officers or men in Helsinki proper. Their German naval authorities, however, have large offices.

The Germans are not allowed to buy out Finnish stores the way they did in Poland, the Balkans and other occupied areas. They are only allowed to buy soap, razors and other necessities.

#### Living conditions in Finland.

Living conditions in Finland are extremely bad, but not as bad as they were last spring. This might be due partly to the fact that spring is always the hardest time of the year in Finland.

The harvest in the fall provides the Finns with a substantial amount of food from September through January and February.

Hereafter, the Finns may, in the past, relied upon shipments of wheat, grain, etc., from the Balkans via Germany. While they were promised food by Germany last spring, a very small amount got through. Salvage black marketing of goods exists in all Finnish restaurants.



- 11 -

This is provided by means of a private dining room in back of the main dining room - usually a very small room. German officers and others who can pay are admitted to the private room where they are served foods which cannot be bought in the front of the restaurant. Miss Bonney had such black market meals in Vipuri and other points. In one of the restaurants in Vipuri, she met German women journalists going to the northern front. She was advised by the Finnish Headquarters officer not to tell them she was going to the Karelian front because the Germans are not even permitting their own correspondents to go there. Furthermore, the presence of an American would have infuriated them. The only reason she got through to the Karelian front was Mannerheim's intervention.

The Germans are not milking Finland because there is nothing to milk. There is no leather. The Germans, however, are taking out 70 to 80 per cent of the unrefined copper and all of the Petsamo nickel under contracts which predated the present war. These ores were always shipped to Germany, however, under contracts obligating Germany to sell back a certain portion of the refined ore.

Both the Finns and the Swedes are feeding a new type of wood pulp cellulose to the cattle as fodder. Under this feeding, milk production has decreased to about 40% of what it was but the cattle are kept from dying.

c. Russo-Finnish peace proposals.

Miss Bonney saw President Ryti in Helsinki and broached the subject of a separate peace with Russia. Ryti felt that the time is not yet ripe for such a peace because Russia was not weak enough. The Finnish do not believe that Britain or the United States is

- 13 -

close enough to the Russians to be able to negotiate such a peace. More important, they feel that even if such a peace were negotiated, neither Britain nor the United States could guarantee that Russia would not, at some future date, overrun Finland again. This talk took place when Stalingrad was reported to have fallen, i.e., in October, 1940. Now that Russia seems stronger than ever, the Finnish may be even less desirous of peace. There is, however, a strong opposition group in Parliament who believe that Finland, now that it has already got back eastern Karelia, is no longer fighting a defensive war. Miss Bonney had a long talk with representatives of this group. She also saw Tanner, prominent Parliamentarian, regarding a separate peace. He also added that constant rumors of separate peace, emanating from British propagandists, were a great mistake and were hurting Finland, because it only throws Finland into the arms of Germans who are goaded thereby into investigating and putting pressure on Finland to break any ties with the United Nations.

#### d. American Legation in Finland.

The American Legation in Helsinki is practically boycotted by the Finns. Miss Bonney dined with our minister, Mr. Shoenfeld, and Mr. McClinton, First Secretary. When she found that they were being boycotted, she told them she did not feel it would be well to be seen with them too much because it might prejudice her activities. In talks over the various agencies in Washington with them, she was advised that if any OSS people came over as agents, none of their staff would meet them and to maintain contact via the Legation without being officially approved by the Legation.

- 14 -

She had an opportunity to make a broadcast for CBS in Helsinki. She consulted Shoenfeld on it. He told her he thought it would be alright, but rather delicate.

While in Helsinki, she continued to live her cover. She visited creches and hospitals as a correspondent, and followed up topics suggested by Government officials.

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e. Propaganda.

In furtherance of her mission to break up anti-English propaganda, she consulted members of the Finance Committee of Parliament, and proved to them that their own propaganda minister, Remper, was sponsoring German propaganda which was false. Particularly, she produced clippings from Berne, showing that the German press quoted Mannerheim as making pro-Nazi speeches. The Finns know that Mannerheim had never written or authorized any such statements. Her point was that they were using their own funds through the Propaganda Minister to indulge in pro-Nazi inspired propaganda which was breaking relations between the United States and Finland; that their greatest enemy was the Germans. After she made these revelations and returned some weeks later to London, she found out that Finland had stopped broadcasting pro-Nazi, anti-British propaganda over the radio shortly after she left. She takes the credit for having brought this about.

The general attitude of the Finns is that they hate the Russians as their first enemy, and that they hate the Germans about 1 degree less. The Germans have done many things to irritate the Finns. Prior to Finland's entry into the war, about 2,000 Finns volunteered and joined up with the Germans on the Caucasian front. Some of the Finns were actively pro-Nazi. When Finland entered the war, these Finns wanted to come back and fight on their home front, but Germany would not permit this and produced papers supposedly signed by them in which they signed up for 5 years, and became German citizens.

Regarding propaganda, Finland is not restricted to a

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wave bans. The Finns, however, deplore our own radio propaganda to them. They do not like it because we talk down to them. They further resent the fact that our broadcasts, which are relayed through London, bear a little prologue mentioning the fact that the BBC is doing the broadcasting. This apparently leads some Finns to believe that the broadcasts are not American at all.

Likewise, an American propaganda leaflet which O.W.I. planned to spread from Sweden into Finland is considered very poor, particularly because its cover bore a picture of figures rallying around the American and Finnish flags. This was considered too naive and straightforward. It was turned down by Witting, pro-Nazi Finnish Foreign Minister. The opposition group would be glad to push it through, but feels that it is not up to par. The German propaganda publication, a monthly entitled Signet, is excellent. It is a replica of Life magazine, bearing interesting and subtle propaganda mixed in with ordinary news shots. It is widely read by the Finns who are avid readers. (Only  $\frac{1}{2}$  of 1% are illiterate.)

f. Russian prisoners in Finland.

The large number of Russian prisoners in Finland has presented an acute problem. With the Finns starving, the Russians last spring were even more starved - being reduced to bare minimum rations. Mannerheim asked the International Red Cross last spring for help. The request was turned over to the American Red Cross which did not answer it until this fall, when they sent in about 8,000 food packages which were psychologically unadapted to the situation. For instance, they contained chocolate which the Finns themselves have not had for years and which they like very much. It caused

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considerable pain to the Finns to see the Russians eat chocolate while their own children went without. The British have solved this problem in other countries by devising different types of food packages for different conditions. Miss Bonney cabled these facts through the American Legation to Dick Allen of the American Red Cross.

g. Proposed broadcast for CBS.

Miss Bonney's original visa for one week was extended for a month. Witting, pro-Nazi Minister, gave her a dinner and told her that she made such a good impression that her visit could be extended. Toward the end of her stay, however, Tanner told her that there was a Himmler man in town and that it might be well for her to go back to Sweden for a while and then come back into Finland. He advised her that if she wished to she could make a broadcast for CBS. She felt, however, that, before undertaking to do this, she should go back to the United States Military Attache in Sweden and check through him with CBS to see if she would be allowed to do this. She therefore went back to Stockholm. Another reason why she returned was that her original 3-month contract was at an end and she wanted to see whether CBS wished her to continue her work.

7. Further Visit to Sweden

The Military Attache, Mr. Gaddell, was not at the Legation but had returned to Washington. She asked the Legation to send a cable through the State Department to Paul White of CBS, telling him that she had been in Finland 25 days, that she could return, and had permission to broadcast from Helsinki. She then asked him if he would prolong her stay for 3 months and send her some money.



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This message was sent on November 9, 1942 in language paraphrased by the Legation. She did not receive any answer until the 7th or 9th of December. She heard, however, that the Legation had queried the State Department concerning her identity.

About a week after cabling White, she sent him another cable by regular channels, asking if he had received her first cable. She received no answer to this. Then the Legation cabled the State Department for an answer to the first cable. Then it sent another follow-up to White. Finally, the French CES representative in Sweden received a cable telling Miss Bonney to come home. In the meantime, the Finnish kept asking if she was coming back to Helsinki. She had obtained a validation on her passport. The State Department then cable'd not to validate the passport, but the Legation told her that she could go anyway. She was debating whether to follow the instructions obtained through CES when the Legation received a message telling her to report to Fisher Howe, OSS, London. The Legation then, of course, knew her identity. She was told that if they had known it sooner, they could have helped her considerably and that a Professor Harper sent over by OSS was placed in a similar position for 6 months, and got nowhere.

At about the time when she received instructions to report to Howe, Waddell, Military Attache, returned from Washington. He told her that the great problem of OSS was communications, and that he felt they should not use the Military Attache, and that he wished they would keep away from him, and that he had to keep a clean slate with the Swedish people.

She then made up a report on her activities, addressed it to



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Col. Preston Goodfellow, G-2, OSS, 4 Building, Washington, D.C., and sent it through the Military Attache's pouch. Waddell advised her that he could not guarantee its delivery, and that it would undoubtedly get into the hands of his chief in Washington. This was sent December 25, 1942. She then flew to London.

### 3. Return Visit to London.

In London, she saw Major Brewer who told her to get out of the country as soon as possible, and not to talk with anybody. He was very nice to her. Brewer did give her permission to talk with BBC representatives about her trip. BBC forms a part of the Intelligence Branch of M.O.I. under the Foreign Office. She went to BBC and talked with Brindley Thomas and 2 broadcasters who wanted to know if their knowledge of the current Finnish situation was correct. She discussed foreign political matters with them, and found out that they saw all reports from the United States Legation in London which went through English Foreign Office. She also learned in London that, after the Finnish Ministry of Information in the United States was closed, the Finnish begged to have it re-opened, promised to have a magazine published which the Americans would approve, but our representative was adamant, and refused to permit its reopening. The Finster also gave her copies of our broadcasts in Finland in order to show that they were not tuned to living conditions in Finland.

H. Mansfield.

1943/43

Date 1/30/43

Colonel Donovan

The report referred to in  
Paragraph 1 is not yet prepared and  
I thought it advisable to send this  
letter in advance. Mr. Mansfield is  
working on the report.

## OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

January 30, 1943

Memorandum to Colonel William J. Donovan  
 From: R. Davis Halliwell  
 Subject: Therese Bonney - Mission to Finland

1. In June, 1942, Miss Therese Bonney, photographer, writer and correspondent, was employed by Colonel Goodfellow to go abroad for OSS under cover of a CBS and Collier's correspondent and try to get into Finland, where she was reputed to be well acquainted with numerous high Finnish officials. Miss Bonney left here August 1, 1942, spent September, November, and December, 1942 in Sweden, and October in Finland, and returned on January 26, 1943. A preliminary report on her activities is attached.

2. Miss Bonney advises that her mission was to (a) determine whether peace could be promoted between Russia and Finland and thus cut Finland off from the Axis, and (b) "sabotage" the anti-British propaganda then coming out of Finland. No more detailed instructions were given. Her mission was unsuccessful as far as promotion of peace was concerned. President Ryti and various Finnish parliamentarians advised her that Russia was too strong to be trusted to live up to a peace and that the U.S. could not approach Russia, much less guarantee the peace. Miss Bonney claims credit for getting the Finance Committee of the Finnish Parliament to put

- 2 -

pressure on Propaganda Minister Rempen to stop pro-Nazi, anti-British radio propaganda coming out of Finland.

3. Because of the writers lack of knowledge of the manner in which this mission was originally formed and sent out, problems are faced on which we would like some advice from you. Miss Bonney states that she was not furnished at the outset with adequate means of communications, planning or training; that she was given no code or cipher; and that she was merely told to contact Colonel Guenther, Colonel Bailey (SOE) and Ambassador Winant in London and our Military Attache in Stockholm. She did this only to find out that they knew nothing of her and could not help her. She further reports that she was provided with no data on the current situation in Finland, and had to try to ferret this information out when she arrived there; furthermore, that she was not instructed on security or on how to conduct herself on operations. The result was that she was eventually uncovered in Sweden. She was suspected upon arrival here when customs officials seized some of her papers, including notebooks containing names of Colonel Goodfellow and Commander Vanderbilt.

4. The following are some of the problems we face:

a. Can she write articles for Colliers and broadcast for CBS? She has collected a mass of data on conditions in Sweden and Finland, obtained under her cover, which she will put in a report to us. No arrangement was made, however, giving us exclusive rights to it, even though we paid all her expenses plus

- 3 -

\$600 per month. We intend to have her hold up publications of any of her data at least until we see what use it might be to us.

b. Should we advise ONI, G-2, FBI, and Customs that she was working for us? While she returned under her cover, she was questioned at the airport upon arrival by the above services, who now suspect her, intend to put her under surveillance, and question her further. They also suspect her OSS connection, especially since Colonel Goodfellow's and Commander Vanderbilt's names appear in her papers seized by Customs. Customs officials advise that they do not know when her papers will be returned.

c. How much information should she give ONI, G-2, FBI, and the Finnish Legation and other governmental agencies such as OAI when they start to question her.

d. Should we make efforts to get her papers back from Customs?

5. I would appreciate any advice you care to provide as to how this matter should be handled from here on. My feeling is that this turns out to be pretty much of an SI matter. In view of the uncertain status of the matter, better might be achieved if it is handled by the originators of the mission, who are more intimately informed than current SO personnel.

R. Davis Halliwell

Bureau of Naval Affairs 12.12.44

SECRET

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.



SECRET

## OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

## INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO  
FROM  
SUBJECT

DATE

The Bureau is  
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supplies  
necessary  
to the  
Bureau

## OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

## INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Colonel Donovan

DATE: January 21, 1943

FROM: Mr. Roper

SUBJECT: Conversation of Mr. King with General Bathford

The General emphasized the necessity of sending training material to French Troops in Africa as soon as possible. He pointed out that the Germans are already starting a clever propaganda campaign to the effect:

(1) That we were merely occupying North Africa and in a much more secondary manner than they had.

(2) That we were merely occupying North Africa and in a much more secondary manner than they had.

(3) That we were merely occupying North Africa and in a much more secondary manner than they had.

(4) That we were merely occupying North Africa and in a much more secondary manner than they had.

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(10) That we were merely occupying North Africa and in a much more secondary manner than they had.

(11) That we were merely occupying North Africa and in a much more secondary manner than they had.

(12) That we were merely occupying North Africa and in a much more secondary manner than they had.





OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

January 15, 1943

MEMORANDUM

FROM: A. R. Lusey  
TO: Mr. James R. Murphy

Confirming our conversation yesterday, I would appreciate your seeing that General George hears about the following:

In Karachi, Captain A. I. Boyer, ATC traffic man, is extremely helpful, not only to me but to everyone going through Karachi. I have been into that field late at night and have left as early as four o'clock in the morning - Captain Boyer is always around.

At Natal, Lieutenant Heald is also very efficient and very helpful.

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON, D. C.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

February 10, 1943

The Secretary of State has received from the  
Director of the Office of War Relocation  
Administration, a report dated January 28, 1943,  
concerning the activities of the Japanese  
Government in the Philippines, and the  
activities of the Japanese Government in the  
Philippines, and the activities of the Japanese  
Government in the Philippines.

Copies to  
Arlund  
Bureau  
S-1.





W. L. ...

... ..

DOUGLAS ...

We have received the following communication from the Department of State:

Reference is made to your letter to Mr. ... of January 10, 1944, which was forwarded to the ... Division requesting removal of the assignment of Mr. Douglas ... to the American Consulate at ... .. previously approved assignment to ... ..

It is noted that Mr. ... is agreeable to the Department ... .. art

AMBASSADE DE BELGIQUE

Washington, April 7, 1944

C. 8070

C. 1000

1000

Colonel ...

*[Handwritten signature]*

His Excellency  
Count Robert van der  
Aarselaar to the U.S. State  
The American Embassy,  
Washington, D.C.

Am: n s: d o t:

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01/29/2017

Colonel R. L. ...

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Sincerely,

William J. Donovan  
Director

January 21, 1943

The Honorable G. Howland Shaw  
Assistant Secretary of State  
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Shaw:

On December 23, 1942, in response to our request of December 18, the Secretary of State appointed Mr. Douglas G. Bonner Special Assistant to the Consul General at Brazzaville. Recent developments now make it necessary to change Mr. Bonner's assignment to Leopoldville, Belgian Congo.

We would, therefore, appreciate it if the Department of State would reassign Mr. Bonner as Special Assistant to the Consul at Leopoldville.

The financial arrangements and communications facilities described in our letter of December 18 would continue in effect.

Mr. Bonner plans to leave this country very soon, and we shall appreciate it if you will advise the Consul at Brazzaville and the Consul at Leopoldville of his reassignment.

Sincerely yours,

HMC:WBC

William J. Donovan

January 21, 1943

FROM: Director of Strategic Services

TO: Douglas C. Bonner

You are instructed to proceed to the Belgian Congo on official business for this office.


You are authorized to carry official and confidential documents essential to the pursuit and fulfillment of your duties.

Your travel orders from Washington to Leopoldville and return have been provided for separately. Any travel which may be essential to the fulfillment of these orders is hereby authorized.

These instructions supersede all previous instructions you have received from this office.


HMC:ABC

William J. Donovan  
Director









CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Department of Justice  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

Your letter of December 14th concerning Brynolf Bjorseth  
has been forwarded to us.

This matter is being handled in the future of real assistance.

It is being handled in the future of real assistance.

It is being handled in the future of real assistance.

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It is being handled in the future of real assistance.



## BRITISH SECURITY CO-ORDINATION

CIRCLE 5-6300

 630, FIFTH AVENUE  
 (ROOM 3513)  
 NEW YORK CITY

April 27th, 1943.

BY SAFE HAND.

Brigadier General William J. Donovan,  
 Director,  
 Office of Strategic Services,  
 Administration Building,  
 Washington, D. C.

Dear General Donovan:

Thank you for your letter of April 23rd, 1943, concerning  
 Wing Commander Bird. I am glad to know that Wing Commander Bird  
 has been of assistance to your organization in the field of research  
 development and procurement.

I am passing a copy of your letter to Sir Charles Hambro  
 with the request that Wing Commander Bird should return to this  
 country very shortly, so that he can continue to work in close  
 collaboration with your organization.

Yours sincerely,

Major General Telfer-Smollett.

Major Gen. A.T. Telford-Mohr  
650 Fifth Avenue, Rm. 3513  
New York, N.Y.

RECEIVED - TELETYPE UNIT

to the following: the advice of the  
the Committee and during the several  
months it has been of great assistance to  
in planning and development in form of  
advice and facilities also regard to special  
services.

[illegible]

1900-1901

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